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The standard of review analysis for judicial review of administrative action developed by the 
Supreme Court of Canada before Dunsmuir v New Brunswick had two important features. 
First, it provided a bulwark against interventionist judges, thereby protecting the autonomy of 
administrative decision makers and promoting deference. Second, it was substantive, rather 
than formal, and moved the focus of judicial review away from abstract concepts and towards 
the eccentricities of statutory schemes. However, in its more recent forays into the general 
principles of judicial review, the Court has threatened to reverse its deferential and 
substantive course by following a formalistic, categorical approach. In this article I describe 
the Court’s efforts to reshape the law of judicial review of administrative action, critique 
these efforts as favouring a formalistic approach to judicial review, and suggest that in its 
haste to simplify the law of judicial review, the Court has jeopardized the due deference that 
should be accorded to administrative decision makers: It has erroneously favoured form over 
substance.
Les normes d’analyse élaborées par la Cour suprême du Canada avant Dunsmuir c New 
Brunswick pour la révision judicaire des mesures administratives comportaient deux car-
actéristiques essentielles. Premièrement, elles procuraient un rempart contre les juges 
interventionnistes, protégeant ainsi l’autonomie du décideur administratif et favorisant le 
devoir de réserve. Deuxièmement, elles donnaient préséance aux faits plutôt qu’aux principes 
et recentraient la révision judiciaire des concepts abstraits vers les particularités des lois. 
Cependant, dans ses plus récentes incursions dans les principes généraux de la révision 
judiciaire, la Cour menace d’inverser son mode d’action réservé et factuel pour le remplacer 
par une approche formaliste et catégorique. Dans cet article, je décris les efforts de la Cour 
visant à remanier le droit de la révision judiciaire des mesures administratives, je critique ces 
efforts qui favorisent selon moi une approche formaliste de la révision judiciaire et je suggère 
que dans sa hâte de simplifi er le droit de la révision judiciaire, la Cour met en péril son devoir 
de réserve envers le législateur et favorise à tort la forme par rapport à la substance.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE STANDARD OF REVIEW ANALYSIS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CAN BE DIFFICULT to grasp. Judicial review, comprised 
in large part of abstract concepts, has a particularly slippery quality. At a high 
level of abstraction, however, it can be understood as the attempt by judges to 
allocate authority between the various organs of government found in the modern 
administrative state. Allocation requires choice, and choice requires a metric by 
which it can be made. When administrative lawyers talk of “error of law,” “grounds 
of review,” “jurisdictional error,” and “standard of review analysis,” they are talking 
about metrics, sometimes called doctrines. Underlying the choices and metrics—
and even choices of metrics—are public law values refracted through a prism of 
judicial attitudes, ideologies, and preferences. But choices and metrics may be limited 
by constitutional principles, such as an obligation to give eff ect to legislative intent, 
or provisions like section 96 of the Constitution Act,1 which has been interpreted as 
guaranteeing the availability of judicial review of administrative action.2 
1. Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 96, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 
5. Th e provision mandates that the Governor General appoint the judges of the Superior, 
District, and County Courts in each Province, excepting the Courts of Probate in Nova 
Scotia and New Brunswick.
2. Crevier v Québec (Attorney General), [1981] 2 SCR 220, 127 DLR (3d) 1.
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A deferential attitude will manifest itself in doctrines that give a degree of 
latitude to administrative decision makers; but an attitude of judicial supremacy 
will be accompanied by doctrines that tend to constrain administrative decision 
makers. Once this is understood, one way of conceptualizing judicial review in 
very broad terms is to visualize judicial attitudes as something of a pendulum, 
capable of swinging from deference on the one side to judicial supremacy on the 
other.3 Note, though, that while one can accept the metaphor of the pendulum, 
one can also think that it ought to be frozen in a particular place. Certainly, 
I think that the pendulum should swing no longer and come to rest on the 
deferential side.4
In the early 1970s in the common law world, the pendulum had swung 
towards judicial supremacy. In its seminal decision in Anisminic,5 the House 
of Lords eff ectively jettisoned the possibility of intra-jurisdictional errors of 
law. Henceforth, any error of law committed by an administrative decision 
maker constituted a jurisdictional error which could be corrected on judicial 
review,6 even in the presence of a statutory provision purporting to exclude any 
review of the decision maker’s decision. Th e old orthodoxy that errors of law 
could be made “within jurisdiction,” and thus not be open to correction by a 
reviewing court, was no more. A move towards judicial supremacy had already 
been made by the resurrection of the doctrine of “error of law on the face of the 
record,”7 whereby errors of law that appeared in the written disposition were 
open to correction, but Anisminic made the shift conclusive. In Metropolitan Life 
Insurance v International Union of Operating Engineers,8 the Supreme Court of 
Canada followed suit without off ering any analysis to support its decision to do 
so, even in the face of a statutory provision purporting to oust judicial review. In 
3. For an earlier use of the metaphor, see Andrew J Roman, “Th e Pendulum Swings Back: Case 
Comment WW Lester (1978) Ltd v UA, Local 740” (1991) 48:1 Admin LR 274.
4. Paul Daly, “Deference on Questions of Law” (2011) 74:5 Mod L Rev 694; Paul Daly, A 
Th eory of Deference in Administrative Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 
[Daly, Th eory of Deference]. 
5. Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission, [1969] 2 AC 147, 2 WLR 163 (HL) [Anisminic].
6. Th is is a general rule, subject to some limited exceptions. See In re Racal Communications Ltd, 
[1981] AC 374 at 383-384, (1980) 3 WLR 181; R v Hull University Visitor, ex parte Page, 
[1993] AC 682 at 693-95, [1993] 1 All ER 97; R v Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 
ex parte South Yorkshire Transport, [1993] 1 WLR 23 [Monopolies and Mergers Commission]. 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission may also be an authority for a limited exception, but its 
extent is very much a matter of uncertainty. See e.g. Paul Craig, Administrative Law 6th ed 
(London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2008) at 467-70.
7. R v Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shaw, [1952] 1 KB 338 at 352, 
1 All ER 122.
8. [1970] SCR 425, 11 DLR (3d) 336 [Metropolitan].
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Bell v Ontario (Human Rights Commission),9 the Court confi rmed the existence 
of a distinction between jurisdictional errors and non-jurisdictional errors, with 
the former rendering any affl  icted decision unlawful, even in situations where a 
fi nal decision had not yet been taken.
Th ere were two problems with this approach. First, it relied on formalistic 
distinctions between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional errors, as well as 
distinctions between errors of law and other errors. Abstract categories were 
developed and applied without regard to the subject matter under review. No 
attention was paid to the intricacies of the underlying statutory scheme (including 
the characteristics of the decision maker and its decision-making process) that 
the legislature had established and that the administrative decision maker had 
interpreted: 
Formalism is formal in that it requires judges to operate with categories and 
distinctions that determine results without the judges having to deploy the 
substantive arguments that underpin the categories and distinctions. Since those 
categories and distinctions must take on a life of their own in order to operate in 
this detached way, they are capable of determining results that contradict the very 
arguments for these categories and distinctions.10
Second, the approach was not deferential. It manifested an attitude of 
hostility towards administrative decision makers. One can speculate that 
common law judges remained in thrall to Dicey and considered themselves 
to be bulwarks against Leviathan,11 or that legal practice’s constant search for 
the best answer to distinctively legal questions coloured the judicial attitude 
to reviewing errors of law.12
Whatever the reason, the Court’s administrative law jurisprudence in the 
1960s and 1970s provoked some strong criticism,13 and the leading academics 
9. [1971] SCR 756, 18 DLR (3d) 1 [Bell].
10. David Dyzenhaus, “Constituting the Rule of Law: Fundamental Values in Administrative 
Law” (2002) 27:2 Queen’s LJ 445 at 450.
11. See Ian Holloway, “‘A Bona Fide Attempt’: Chief Justice Sir Owen Dixon and the Policy of 
Deference to Administrative Expertise in the High Court of Australia” (2002) 54:2 Admin L 
Rev 687 at 698. Th is attitude is still prevalent. See e.g. Canada (Fisheries and Oceans) v David 
Suzuki Foundation, 2012 FCA 40 at paras 71-76 (available on CanLII).
12. See generally, Luc Tremblay, “La norme de retenue judiciaire et les ‘erreurs de droit’ en 
droit administratif: une erreur de droit? Au delà du fondationalisme et du scepticism” 
(1996) 56:2 R du B 141.
13. See e.g. HW Arthurs, “Rethinking Administrative Law: A Slightly Dicey Business” (1979) 17:1 
Osgoode Hall LJ 1; PW Hogg, “Th e Jurisdictional Fact Doctrine in the Supreme Court of 
Canada: Bell v. Ontario Human Rights Commission” (1971) 9:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 203 [Hogg, 
“Jurisdictional Fact Doctrine”]; PW Hogg, “Judicial Review: How Much Do We Need?” 
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of the day counselled a deferential approach.14 Although the Court’s record was 
not roundly condemned,15 Justice Wilson, looking back, saw evidence of
a lack of sympathy for the proposition that if administrative tribunals are to function 
eff ectively and effi  ciently, then we must recognise (1) that their decisions are crafted 
by those with specialized knowledge of the subject matter before them; and (2) 
that there is value in limiting the extent to which their decisions may be frustrated 
through an expansive judicial review.16
Th us, by the end of the 1970s, there was some impetus for a deferential 
approach. Th e New Brunswick Liquor case17 is “commonly considered the starting 
point for the acceptance of the notion of deference in Canadian administrative 
law and of its importance in framing the law of judicial review.”18 In two 
important ways, Justice Dickson set Canadian law on a deferential course. First, 
he admonished reviewing courts “not [to] be alert to brand as jurisdic tional, 
and therefore subject to broader curial review, that which may be doubtfully 
so.”19 Second, he held that an interpretation of law by an expert tribunal, made 
within its jurisdiction, could only be quashed by a court if the interpretation was 
patently unreasonable.20
Th e development of what came to be called the “standard of review” 21 analysis 
gathered momentum in the 1980s22 and 1990s.23 By the time of its decision in 
(1974) 20:2 McGill LJ 157; Paul Weiler, “Th e ‘Slippery Slope’ of Judicial Intervention: Th e 
Supreme Court and Canadian Labour Relations 1950-1970” (1971) 9:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 1.
14. John Willis, “Canadian Administrative Law in Retrospect” (1974) 24:2 UTLJ 225 at 244-46; 
DJ Mullan, “Th e Federal Court Act: A Misguided Attempt at Administrative Law Reform?” 
(1973) 23:1 UTLJ 14 at 36-43.
15. PW Hogg, “Th e Supreme Court of Canada and Administrative Law, 1949-1971” (1973) 
11:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 187; David Mullan, “Th e Jurisdictional Fact Doctrine in the Supreme 
Court of Canada – A Mitigating Plea” (1972) 10:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 440.
16. National Corn Growers Association v Canada (Import Tribunal), [1990] 2 SCR 1324 at para 
8, 74 DLR (4th) 449. See also JM Evans, “Developments in Administrative Law: Th e 1984-85 
Term” (1986) 8:1 Sup Ct L Rev 1 at 27-28.
17. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v New Brunswick Liquor Corporation, [1979] 
2 SCR 227, 25 NBR (2d) 327 [New Brunswick Liquor cited to SCR].
18. Th e Honourable Mr. Justice Louis LeBel, “Some Properly Deferential Th oughts on 
Deference” (2008) 21:1 Can J Admin L & P 1 at 2.
19. New Brunswick Liquor, supra note 17 at 233.
20. Ibid at 237.
21. Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 63, 1 SCR 190 [Dunsmuir].
22. Syndicat des employés de production du Québec et de l’Acadie v Canada Labour Relations Board and 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, [1984] 2 SCR 412, 14 DLR (4th) 457 [Canada Labour Relations 
Board]; Union des employés de service, local 298 v Bibeault, [1988] 2 SCR 1048, 95 NR 161 [Bibeault].
23. Pezim v British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] 2 SCR 557, 114 DLR (4th) 
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Pushpanathan,24 the Court had refi ned this approach into a four-factor inquiry 
considering: (1) whether a privative clause protected the decision, or conversely, 
a right of appeal was provided for; (2) the expertise of the decision maker, relative 
to the reviewing court and relative to the decision under review; (3) the purpose 
of the decision maker as determined by a consideration of the parent statute; 
and (4) the nature of the decision, whether closer to law and more suited to 
judicial oversight, or closer to fact and thus demanding deference. Depending on 
the interplay of the four factors, one of three standards of review was to apply: 
correctness, which entitled the reviewing court to “undertake its own reasoning 
process to arrive at the result it judges correct”;25 reasonableness simpliciter, 
which required the reviewing court to test the impugned decision to ascertain 
whether it could withstand a “somewhat probing examination”;26 and patent 
unreasonableness, which required the reviewing court to affi  rm the decision 
unless it was “so patently unreasonable that [it] cannot be rationally supported 
by the relevant legislation and demands intervention by the court upon review.”27 
Th e standards of review themselves formed something of a spectrum, ranging 
from correctness at the most interventionist point and patent unreasonableness 
at the most deferential. 
Th e standard of review analysis had two important features. First, it provided 
something of a bulwark against interventionist judges. It is harder to go through 
a four-factor analysis and conclude that correctness is the appropriate standard of 
review than it is to classify a question as one of jurisdiction or law and thus apt 
for judicial intervention, eff ectively on a standard of review of correctness. Four 
steps are greater than one. I do not mean to suggest that the four-factor analysis 
presented an insurmountable hurdle. Doctrine can only do so much, and it is 
always open to subversion.28 But the standard of review analysis made it harder to 
385; Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v Southam Inc, [1997] 1 SCR 748, 144 
DLR (4th) 1 [Southam cited to SCR].
24. Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister for Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 SCR 982, 160 
DLR (4th) 193 [Pushpanathan cited to SCR].
25. Law Society of New Brunswick v Ryan, 2003 SCC 20 at para 50, 1 SCR 247, Iacobucci J.
26. Southam, supra note 23 at para 56 Iacobucci J.
27. New Brunswick Liquor, supra note 17 at 237, Dickson J.
28. See e.g. Grant Huscroft, “Judicial Review from CUPE to CUPE: Less is Not Always 
More” in Grant Huscroft & Michael Taggart, eds, Inside and Outside Canadian 
Administrative Law: Essays in Honour of David Mullan (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2006) 296; Gabrielle Perrault, Le contrôle judiciaire des decisions de 
l’Administration: de l’erreur juridictionnelle à la norme de contrôle (Montréal: Wilson 
and Lafl eur, 2002) at 100-04; Christopher Taylor, “Curial Deference and Judicial 
Review” (1991) 13:1 Advocates’ Q 78; Mark Walters, “Jurisdiction, Functionalism, and 
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justify intervention. It is not surprising that the New Brunswick Liquor decision 
has been described as having “marked the Court’s acceptance of the legitimacy of 
the administrative state.”29
Second, the standard of review analysis was more substantive than it was 
formal. It was concerned with the intricacies of the statutory scheme rather than 
abstract concepts such as jurisdiction and error of law.30 In stark contrast to the 
formalistic distinctions that it replaced, the standard of review analysis required 
determinations of the appropriate intensity of judicial review to be “made on a 
case-by-case basis” 31 in a manner “realistically cognizant of the institutional realities 
of the administrative state.”32 In this sense, it was unrelentingly substantive:
Conceptual and abstract ways of thinking about law and legal problems have given 
way to an approach that pays more attention to the social, economic, and political 
contexts from which the issues arise, and to the likely consequences of resolving 
them one way rather than another, both for the immediately concerned litigants and 
for the wider public interests.33
Moreover, the “central inquiry” of the standard of review analysis was into 
legislative intent.34 On examining the substance of the statute establishing the 
Constitutionalism in Canadian Administrative Law” in Christopher Forsyth et al, eds, 
Eff ective Judicial Review: A Cornerstone of Good Governance (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010) 300 at 307.
29. David Dyzenhaus & Evan Fox-Decent, “Rethinking the Process-Substance Distinction: 
Baker v Canada” (2001) 51:3 UTLJ 193 at 200. However, “Judges remained at the apex 
of the interpretive hierarchy, with some accommodation made for the phenomenon of 
administrative decision making.” Ibid at 203.
30. I do not claim that the standard of review analysis was entirely substantive. For example, the 
‘nature of the question’ factor is just as formal as the concept of error of law; however, its 
relegation to a single factor rather than an organizing principle of judicial review pushed the 
standard of review analysis away from substance and towards form. 
31. Ontario (Attorney General) v Ontario Public Service Employees Union (2000), 52 OR (3d) 77 
at para 33, 195 DLR (4th) 376 (CA), Moldaver JA.
32. Robert Leckey, “Territoriality in Canadian Administrative Law” (2004) 54:3 UTLJ 327 at 
362.
33. John M Evans & Trevor Knight, “Cory on Administrative Law: A Contextual Study” in 
Patrick J Monahan & Sandra A Forbes, eds, Peter Cory at the Supreme Court of Canada: 
1989-1999 (Winnipeg: Canadian Legal History Project, 2001) 71 at 72. 
34. Pushpanathan, supra note 24 at para 26, Bastarache J. Th is was largely, though not entirely, 
accurate. Th e “nature of the question” factor, for example, must be detached from legislative 
intent because there is no compelling basis from which to infer that legislators intend to 
delegate legal questions to courts or factual questions to administrative decision makers. 
Rather, for legitimacy, this factor must rely on a background assumption about the propriety 
of courts, as opposed to administrators, answering questions of law. 
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decision maker and the provisions the decision maker had interpreted, a reviewing 
court could determine in a rough sense the intended relationship between the 
court and the decision maker. A link to legislative intent was capable of providing 
the standard of review analysis with a theoretical footing much fi rmer than any 
available to the formalistic distinctions relied upon previously.35
However, in its more recent forays into the general principles of judicial 
review, the Court has threatened to reverse its deferential and substantive course 
by substituting a formalistic, categorical approach for a contextual, case-by-case 
analysis. In this article, I will describe the Court’s eff orts to reshape the law of 
judicial review of administrative action; I will critique these eff orts on the basis that 
the formal, categorical approach is not soundly based, is not coherent, and leads 
to confl ict between the prescribed categories; I will argue that key questions about 
the new, unifi ed standard of reasonableness have been inadequately answered; and 
I will suggest that in its haste to simplify the law of judicial review, the Court has 
jeopardized the due deference that should be accorded to administrative decision 
makers and has erroneously favoured form over substance. Th e problems with 
the new approach bode ill for the lower courts, lawyers, and litigants tasked with 
following it. For this reason, the problems ought to be highlighted, and the Court 
ought to be encouraged to change its course.
II. THE CONFUSION OF DUNSMUIR: PRESUMPTIONS, 
CATEGORIES, AND FACTORS
Th eoretical consistency had, to some extent, been achieved by the early years 
of the twenty-fi rst century. However, it came at the expense of practical 
understanding: It was said that the standard of review analysis provides “great 
fl exibility but little real on-the-ground guidance, and off ers too many standards 
of review.”36 As a Federal Court judge complained:
As is becoming increasingly common in administrative law cases, a prodigious 
amount of time was spent by the parties, at both the hearing before me and in 
their written submissions, regarding the correct standard of review to be applied. 
35. Daly, Th eory of Deference, supra note 4, ch 2. 
36. Dusmuir, supra note 21 at para 43, Bastarache and LeBel JJ. For criticism from judges 
charged with applying the standard of review analysis, see e.g. Calgary Health Region v United 
Nurses of Alberta, Local 95, 2005 ABQB 893 at para 20, 55 Alta LR (4th) 284; Currie v 
Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), 2006 FCA 194 at paras 20-23, [2007] 1 FCR 471; 
Miller v Newfoundland (Workers’ Compensation Commission) (1997) 154 Nfl d and PEIR 52 
(Nfl d SC (TD)); Poulin c Centre hospitalier Anna Laberge, [2004] JQ No 4237 (CS).
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Although counsel did an admirable job of analysing the jurisprudence in order 
to delineate the fi ne and often obscure nuances between the concepts of patent 
unreasonableness and reasonableness simpliciter, it is obvious that what has 
developed in this fi eld of law is an unwieldy framework which is unnecessarily 
complex and diffi  cult to apply.37 
For the Court, this was too high a price to pay, and it adopted the opportunity 
presented by Dunsmuir v New Brunswick to reshape Canadian administrative law. 
In the fi rst paragraph of their majority reasons, Justices Bastarache and LeBel 
explained that the Court considered it necessary to develop solutions that could 
“provide real guidance for litigants, counsel, administrative decision makers or 
judicial review judges.”38 In his concurring reasons, Justice Binnie identifi ed 
“afoot in the legal profession a desire for clearer guidance than is provided by 
lists of principles, factors and spectrums.”39 Th e standard of review analysis 
had drawbacks, chief among them being signifi cant “predecision costs”;40 the 
reviewing court had to spend a signifi cant amount of time focusing on matters 
that are, from a litigant’s point of view, quite arcane.41
Accordingly, the Court implemented changes at both stages of the standard of 
review analysis. First, in determining the appropriate standard of review, the Court 
held that an “exhaustive review” of the standard of review analysis factors would not 
be “required in every case.”42 In particular, where previous jurisprudence indicated the 
appropriate standard of review, a full analysis would be unnecessary since “the analysis 
required is already deemed to have been performed and need not be repeated.”43 But 
also, the Court noted, it would not “be necessary to consider all of the factors, as some 
of them may be determinative in the application of the reasonableness standard in a 
specifi c case.”44 Second, the Court held that the number of available standards should 
be reduced from three to two: “[T]he two variants of reasonableness review should 
be collapsed into a single form of ‘reasonableness’ review. Th e result is a system of 
judicial review comprising two standards—correctness and reasonableness.”45 In what 
37. Mountain Parks Watershed Assn v Chateau Lake Louise Corp, 2004 FC 1222 at para 11, 263 
FTR 12, Rouleau J.
38. Dunsmuir, supra note 21 at para 1.
39. Ibid at para 132.
40. See generally Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional Th eory of Legal 
Interpretation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).
41. Dunsmuir, supra note 21 at para 133, Binnie J.
42. Ibid at para 57.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid at para 64.
45. Ibid at para 45.
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follows, I will concentrate on the Court’s reshaping of the fi rst stage, but afterwards I 
will return to the unifi ed reasonableness standard. 
Peppered throughout the Court’s discussion in Dunsmuir of how reviewing 
courts should determine the appropriate standard of review are references to 
certain shortcuts or presumptions that should be borne in mind. For example, the 
presence of a privative clause would be a “strong indication of review pursuant to 
the reasonableness standard”;46 it was also said that “[d]eference will usually result 
where a tribunal is interpreting its own statute or statutes closely connected to 
its function, with which it will have particular familiarity.”47 On the correctness 
side of the ledger, the Court noted that previous jurisprudence had established 
that correctness would be the appropriate standard of review for several types of 
questions, namely constitutional questions,48 “true questions of jurisdiction,”49 
questions of general law,50 and those involving overlaps between diff erent decision 
makers’ jurisdictions.51 Nevertheless, the Court expressly retained the four factors 
that comprised the standard of review analysis52 and even applied them to the 
facts of Dunsmuir.53
Th at there was some conceptual confusion underlying the Court’s analysis is 
suggested by its infelicitous observation that where a question of “fact, discretion 
or policy” is subject to review, “deference will usually apply automatically.”54 It 
is worth pausing for a moment to consider the linguistic wonder that is ‘the 
thing that usually happens automatically.’ A sliding door that usually opens 
automatically is likely to lead to puzzled pedestrians at best and bruised noses 
at worst. A company that usually deposits paychecks automatically is unlikely to 
gain the trust of its employees. At least with respect to this category of decision, 
it is entirely unclear what the Court was trying to say. 
Th is linguistic problem points to deeper problems with Dunsmuir. At the 
same time as it purported to establish presumptive categories to which either 
reasonableness or correctness would be appropriately applied, the Court 
maintained the four-factor standard of review analysis. It used the words “usually” 
46. Ibid at para 52.
47. Ibid at para 54.
48. Ibid at para 58.
49. Ibid at para 59.
50. Ibid at para 60.
51. Ibid at para 61.
52. Ibid at para 64.
53. Ibid at paras 66-71.
54. Ibid at para 53. 
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and “generally” on several occasions.55 It gave no guidance as to when the 
presumptions would be rebutted or displaced or what weight the presumptions 
should be given, which is problematic for reasons recently expressed by Justice 
Cromwell: “Creating a presumption without providing guidance on how one 
could tell whether it has been rebutted does not, in my respectful view, provide 
any assistance to reviewing courts.”56 Th e Court also gave no guidance on 
the order in which a reviewing court should proceed. Should it consider the 
presumptions fi rst and then the four factors? Or should it consider the four 
factors fi rst and then the presumptions? On fi rst sight, the second formulation 
might seem at odds with the Court’s overall approach, but there is a logic 
to it. Th e four-factor standard of review analysis would be applied, but if it 
produced an anomalous result, reference to the presumptions would correct 
the anomaly. In some anomalous case, the four-factor analysis might suggest 
correctness, even in respect of a fact-laden decision, but the presumption that 
factual determinations attract deference would counsel reasonableness.57 Th is 
lack of clarity is troubling and indicative of a Court that may not truly know 
its own mind.58
55. Ibid at paras 51, 53-54, 57. 
56. Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61 
at para 92, 3 SCR 654 [Alberta Teachers’ Association].
57. See e.g. Dr Q v College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, 2003 SCC 19, 1 
SCR 226. In the Court’s view, three of the standard of review analysis factors pointed to 
correctness and only one towards deference. Th ere, the standard of reasonableness simpliciter 
was available. Post-Dunsmuir, the four-factor analysis would at least point towards review on 
a correctness standard, but this may not be suffi  cient to rebut the presumption of deference. 
58. A further lack of clarity is revealed by the ongoing uncertainty about Dunsmuir’s applicability 
to non-adjudicative decision makers. See e.g. Globalive Wireless Management Corp v Public 
Mobile Inc, 2011 FCA 194 at para 35, 3 FCR 344 [Globalive]; Toussaint v Canada (Attorney 
General), 2011 FCA 213 at para 19, FCJ No 984 (QL); Georgia Strait Alliance v Canada 
(Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), 2012 FCA 40 at paras 83-100, FCJ No 157 (QL); 
Mamnuni v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2011 FC 736 at 
para 33, FCJ No 1108 (QL). Th e Court has continued to assume the applicability of the 
unifi ed approach established in Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 
[1999] 2 SCR 817, SCJ No 39 (QL) [Baker]. According to this approach, all decision 
makers exercising statutory powers are subject to the same general principles of judicial 
review. See e.g. Catalyst Paper Corp v North Cowichan (District), 2012 SCC 2 at paras 12-13, 
1 SCR 5 [Catalyst]. I assume unity in what follows, with the caveat that the Court’s future 
decisions will have to be watched and parsed closely to vindicate or defeat the accuracy of my 
assumption. 
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III. THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH SOLIDIFIED
While the Court is still guilty of equivocating in its recent decisions,59 it seems to 
have pinned its colours fi rmly to the mast of the categorical approach. In doing 
so, the Court has dashed the hopes of those who viewed Dunsmuir as off ering 
“relatively modest adjustments”60 or a lexical rather than conceptual contribution 
to the administrative law oeuvre.61 Justice Fish, writing for the majority in Smith v 
Alliance Pipeline, explained the “analytical framework”62 established by Dunsmuir 
in the following terms. Correctness applies to: (1) constitutional issues; (2) 
questions of general law both of central importance to the legal system as a whole 
and outside the adjudicator’s specialized area of expertise; (3) the drawing of 
jurisdictional lines between two or more competing specialized tribunals; and (4) 
true questions of jurisdiction or vires. Reasonableness is normally the governing 
standard where the question at issue: (1) relates to the interpretation of the 
tribunal’s home statute or statutes closely connected to its function with which 
it will have particular familiarity; (2) raises issues of fact, discretion, or policy; or 
(3) involves inextricably intertwined legal and factual issues.63
Judging by the use of the word “normally” to describe the categories in 
respect of which reasonableness should be the “governing standard,”64 the Court 
is still equivocating somewhat. Indeed, the categories are also described as “non-
exhaustive,”65 and the standard of review factors remain as “guideposts.”66 
Further equivocal language can be found in respect of the categorical 
approach. Justice Fish commented in Alliance Pipeline that judges can “usefully 
begin their analysis” by ascertaining the appropriate category. He went on to 
59. Smith v Alliance Pipeline, 2011 SCC 7, 1 SCR 160 [Alliance Pipeline]; Canada (Canadian 
Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 53, 3 SCR 471 
[Canadian Human Rights Commission]; Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc v Manitoba 
Association of Health Care Professionals, 2011 SCC 59, 3 SCR 616 [Nor-Man]; Alberta 
Teachers’ Association, supra note 56.
60. Walters, supra note 28 at 308.
61. “Aussi suis-je enclin à penser que Dunsmuir n’est qu’une péripétie de moindre importance, 
une contribution lexicale plutôt que conceptuelle au droit administratif canadien, et assez 
peu de choses à côté de l’arrêt SCFP.” Yves-Marie Morissette, “Rétrospective et Prospective 
sur le Contentieux Administratif ” (2008-2009) 39:1 RDUS 1 at 15.
62. Alliance Pipeline, supra note 59 at para 27. See similarly Alberta Teachers’ Association, supra note 56.
63. Alliance Pipeline, ibid at para 26.
64. Nor-Man, supra note 59 at para 37. 
65. Ibid at para 25.
66. Nor-Man, supra note 59 at para 41.
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note that “the fi rst step will suffi  ce ... in this case”67—not, by implication, in all 
cases. But this equivocal language aside, the message of Alliance Pipeline and its 
confrères is clear: Reviewing courts should approach the task of judicial review 
by reference to a categorical approach. Th e fi rst, and usually decisive, step will 
be to categorize the question at issue. Categorization, rather than a four-factor 
analysis, will determine the applicable standard of review. If it once were possible 
to say that Dunsmuir is “Pushpanathan in party dress,”68 it is no longer the case. 
Indeed, Justice Fish’s analysis in Alliance Pipeline focused on the categories into 
which the questions at issue fell, concluding fi rst that “all fall within categories 
which according to Dunsmuir generally attract the standard of reasonableness,”69 
and second that “[c]onversely, it is clear that this case does not fall within any 
of the categories which, under Dunsmuir, attract a standard of correctness.”70 
Moreover, the Court has purported to apply the categorical approach consistently 
in its recent decisions. For example, in Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc 
v Manitoba Association of Health Care Professionals,71 the decision of a labour 
arbitrator was said to involve questions of fact, policy, and discretion for which 
a standard of review of reasonableness would be appropriate. In both Alberta 
(Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association72 and 
Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney General),73 
a reasonableness standard was also applied, ostensibly on the basis that the 
decisions at issue involved interpretations of the decision makers’ home statutes.74
Categories can quite often be malleable. One striking diff erence between 
Dunsmuir and Alliance Pipeline is the breadth of the “general questions of law” 
category in the latter. In Dunsmuir, Justices Bastarache and LeBel described the 
category in the following terms:
[C]ourts must also continue to substitute their own view of the correct answer 
where the question at issue is one of general law “that is both of central importance 
to the legal system as a whole and outside the adjudicator’s specialized area of 
expertise.” Because of their impact on the administration of justice as a whole, such 
questions require uniform and consistent answers.  Such was the case in Toronto 
(City) v. CUPE, which dealt with complex common law rules and confl icting 
67. Alliance Pipeline, supra note 59 at para 25 [emphasis added].  
68. Hudson Janisch, “Something Old, Something New” (2010) 23:3 Can J Admin L & P 219.
69. Alliance Pipeline, supra note 59 at para 33.
70. Ibid at para 34.
71. Nor-Man, supra note 59.
72. Supra note 56.
73. Supra note 59.
74. I use the words “purported” and “ostensibly” advisedly.
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jurisprudence on the doctrines of res judicata and abuse of process — issues that are 
at the heart of the administration of justice. 75
To fi t into this category, an issue must be (1) a question of general law; (2) 
of central importance to the legal system as a whole; (3) of such importance 
because of its impact on the administration of justice as a whole; and (4) 
outside the decision maker’s expertise.76 In Alliance Pipeline, the third criterion 
was dropped. Th e category is now much broader.77 Th e examples given in 
Dunsmuir—res judicata and abuse of process—might be roughly described 
as procedural questions of wide importance, often for other areas of the legal 
system, on which administrators lack expertise relative to courts.78 Moreover, if 
the examples were intended as exemplars of the category, then the category was 
quite narrow. But by removing the requirement that the question raise issues 
relating to the administration of justice the Court has increased the scope of one 
of the correctness categories. Th e ease with which the Dunsmuir limitation was 
airbrushed out of judicial review doctrine is troubling.
Finally, it is striking that there is no similar equivocal language in respect 
of the correctness categories. Th is should be troubling for those who believe 
in deference. Some indeterminate factors might pull a decision from the 
reasonableness category into the correctness category, but there are no factors 
pulling in the opposite direction. In Dunsmuir and subsequently, the Court has 
mandated one-way traffi  c from reasonableness to correctness. 
Having mapped out the terrain, I will argue in the following sections that 
the categories are unclear, that they are both over- and under-inclusive, and that 
they confl ict. Confusion for lower-court judges, counsel, and litigants will be the 
unfortunate by-product of the formal approach preferred by the Court. 
IV. ARE THE CATEGORIES SOUNDLY BASED?
If it is thought desirable to follow a categorical approach, then the categories 
must have sound bases. As Justice Deschamps, the only member of the Court 
not to join Justice Fish’s majority in Alliance Pipeline, rightly protested: “[T]he 
75. Supra note 21 at para 60 [internal citation omitted].
76. See also the characterization of this category by the Québec Court of Appeal in Syndicat 
du personnel technique et professionnel de la Société des alcools du Québec (SPTP) c Société des 
alcools du Québec, 2011 QCCA 1642 at para 70 Bich JA [Syndicat du personnel technique].
77. See also Binnie J’s wider-still conception of the category in his concurring reasons in Alberta 
Teachers’ Association, supra note 56 at para 84.
78. See Gerald Heckman, “Nor-Man Regional Health Authority: Labour Arbitration, Questions 
of General Law and the Challenges of Legal Centrism” (2011) 35:1 Man LJ 63 at 72-73.
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development of any category of question that would tend to eliminate the need 
for a more fulsome analysis of the standard of review has to be grounded in a 
defensible rationale.”79 As I shall suggest, what are ostensibly neat distinctions 
between law, fact, and mixed law and fact turn out on proper examination 
neither to be neat nor based on a defensible rationale.80 Moreover, the reliance 
on a category of jurisdictional questions is extremely dubious. On the surface, 
the categories may look clear, but I will argue that any appearance of clarity is 
deceptive.
A. LAW, FACT, AND MIXED LAW AND FACT81
One should not be too quick to label a question one of “law.” Proper characterization 
requires an appreciation of the nuances of the decision under review and the 
decision-making process that produced it. Consider the decision of the Court in 
Metropolitan Life Insurance v International Union of Operating Engineers,82 the “high 
water mark of activist” judicial review of administrative action in Canada. 83 At issue 
here was section 7(3) of the Ontario Labour Relations Act,84 which, inter alia, allowed 
the Labour Relations Board to certify a trade union as a bargaining agent if the Board 
were satisfi ed that more than fi fty-fi ve percent of the employees were “members of the 
trade union.” Th e applicant company sought certiorari of a certifi cation decision on the 
basis that its employees were not “members” of the respondent trade union within the 
meaning of the trade union’s constitution. For its part, the Board had developed a policy 
whereby it assessed whether employees were members of a trade union by reference to 
a number of factors. Th e Court held that the Board had committed a reviewable error 
of law: 
In proceeding in this manner the Board has failed to deal with the question remitted 
to it (i.e. whether the employees in question were members of the union at the relevant 
date) and instead has decided a question which was not remitted to it (i.e. whether in 
regard to those employees there has been fulfi lment of the conditions stated above).85
79. Alliance Pipeline, supra note 59 at para 92.
80. I address the absence of a defensible rationale in more detail elsewhere. See Daly, Th eory of 
Deference, supra note 4, ch 6 at 220ff .
81. Th is section draws heavily on and revises for a Canadian audience arguments I fi rst formulated 
in Daly, “Deference on Questions of Law,” supra note 4 at 701-06 and Daly, ibid at 238-43.
82. Metropolitan, supra note 8.
83. JM Evans et al, Administrative Law: Cases, Text, and Materials 3d ed (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery, 1989) at 565.
84. RSO 1960, c 202.
85. Metropolitan, supra note 8 at 435.
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In other words, the Court characterized the phrase “members of the 
trade union” as meaning members within the defi nition of the trade union’s 
constitution. It was, in the Court’s view, a neat question of law: It appeared in 
a statutory provision (without further defi nition) and lent itself to an ordinary 
interpretation. 
But the policy the Board had developed casts some doubt on whether the 
meaning of “members of the trade union” was such a neat question of law after 
all. As the Board explained in its decision, “what the Board is concerned with 
is whether the union accords all such employees full rights and privileges as 
members.”86 It did not just rely on the formal defi nitions laid out in the trade 
union’s constitution; rather, it conducted a context-sensitive inquiry. Th e inquiry 
was sensitive both to the circumstances of the group of employees and also to 
labour relations policy more generally, being particularly alert to the prospect 
that formal membership might not represent a trade union’s actual level of 
support. In other words, the decision was one of mixed law and fact. Critically, 
there was no a priori reason for the Court to treat the phrase “members of the 
trade union” as presenting a question of law in some abstract sense. It was not a 
neat legal question since it required a sensitive evaluation of facts and policy.87 
Rather than fi tting neatly into a pre-determined category of “law,” the question 
at issue in Metropolitan Life is better categorized as one of mixed law and fact. 
More than that, the example demonstrates the folly of relying solely on a 
categorical analysis. A reviewing court applying a standard of review analysis to 
the impugned certifi cation decision would have had to assess the nature of the 
question, to be sure, but that would have been only one of the factors taken into 
account in calibrating the standard of review and would not have been decisive 
in and of itself.
It is undeniable that questions of law will sometimes be obviously so, and by their 
nature will be “easily separable from the undisputed facts of the case … .”88 As I have 
suggested elsewhere, the choice of the relevant legal norm—statute, regulation, or 
guideline—and the decision to construe it can be considered questions of law, at least 
at a high level of generality.89 Selecting and developing the relevant legal defi nitions 
from the norm in question may also be questions of law.90 Having refl ected on the 
example of the Metropolitan Life case, however, one should doubt that questions of 
86. Ibid at 429.
87. See e.g. Halifax (Regional Municipality) v Hoelke, 2011 NSCA 96 at paras 11-18, 308 NSR (2d) 277.
88. Pushpanathan, supra note 24 at para 47, Bastarache J.
89. Paul Daly, “Judicial Review of Errors of Law in Ireland” (2006) 41 Irish Jurist 60.
90. See e.g. Anisminic, supra note 5.
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law will regularly be obvious. Such considerations underpinned the warning given 
by Justice Abella in Lévis (City) v Fraternité des policiers de Lévis:91 “ [L]egal issues 
ought not to be declared readily extricable when they are legitimately and necessarily 
intertwined with the adjudicator’s mandate and expertise.”92
Strategies can be employed to try to make questions of law obvious and 
apparent. For example, in Metropolitan Life, the Court could be said to have 
disposed of the narrow question of whether the board could take into account 
factors other than membership within the formal terms of the trade union’s 
constitution. Here, to recall, the Court’s answer was “no.” Th is is a tantalizing 
avoidance strategy. Reformulated, the question is indeed narrower than the 
meaning of the phrase “members of the trade union.” However attractive its 
siren song, the strategy is fl awed because it does not account for the existence 
of “questions of degree.”93 Wh ere a legal defi nition is in substance a question 
of degree, the factors legitimately taken into account may have a “quality of 
continuous variation”94 or consist of “two or more relevant factors”95 of variable 
weight. Th is was the case in respect of the phrase at issue in Metropolitan Life. 
Treating one factor as critical blinded the Court to the existence of a question 
of degree, pursuant to which it was up to the decision maker to decide whether 
factors additional to formal membership should be taken into account. While 
clever, the Court’s avoidance strategy was improper. 
A more honest strategy would be to identify questions of law by a process of 
elimination. One could say that there are three categories of question: law, fact 
(including inferences of fact), and mixed law and fact.96 A fact can be defi ned 
as “[an] assertion that a phenomenon has happened or is or will be happening 
independent of or anterior to any assertion as to its legal eff ect.”97 As for inferences 
of fact, one recalls Jaff e’s memorable phrase, “If the annual rate of depreciation 
of assets of a billion-dollar corporation is a ‘fact’, it is nevertheless a very diff erent 
kind of fact from the bigness of Cyrano’s nose.”98 Once the facts have been 
91. 2007 SCC 14, 1 SCR 591.
92. Ibid at para 112.
93. WA Wilson, “Questions of Degree” (1969) 32:4 Mod L Rev 361.
94. Ibid at 365.
95. Ibid at 368. 
96. A categorization relied upon by the Court in the context of appellate review. See Housen v 
Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, 2 SCR 235 at para 7. See also CT Emery & B Smythe, “Error of 
Law in Administrative Law” (1984) 100 Law Q Rev 612 at 614-15.
97. Louis L Jaff e, “Judicial Review: Question of Law” (1955) 69:2 Harv L Rev 239 at 241.
98. Louis L Jaff e, “Judicial Review: Constitutional and Jurisdictional Fact” (1957) 70:6 Harv L 
Rev 953 at 979.
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ascertained, the decision maker must determine if they satisfy the relevant legal 
norm that “[e]very exercise of regulatory powers, even where there is no legal 
dispute, involves the application of law to facts, a process which requires the 
exercise of reasoning powers.”99 Th ese questions of mixed law and fact constitute 
a grey area between questions of fact and questions of law. Following this strategy, 
a question could be said to be one of law if it were not one of fact or mixed law 
and fact.
Th is alternative approach has the merit of being honest, but it too is 
fl awed because the distinction between law, fact, and mixed law and fact 
cannot withstand scrutiny. Consider the interaction between “law” and “fact,” 
for example. While I do not doubt that there are questions that are clearly 
factual in nature, or that clearly involve an exercise of fact-fi nding powers or 
functions, the boundaries between fact and law are not so clear as to justify the 
creation of hermetically-sealed compartments. In determining the meaning of a 
statutory provision, assessments of the facts presented by a particular case will 
invariably infl uence the decision maker: “[I]l arrive … que la compréhension 
initiale que l’on a d’une règle se nuance à la lumière de la preuve, ce qui ouvre 
la possibilité d’une interprétation nouvelle de la règle.”100 A good example is R 
v Skoke-Graham.101 At issue here was the predecessor to section 176(3) of the 
Criminal Code, pursuant to which it is an off ence to “wilfully [do] anything that 
disturbs the order or solemnity” of a religious gathering.102 Th e appellants were 
convicted, having conducted a dignifi ed protest against a Catholic Church policy 
that communion wafers should be distributed only to standing service-goers, not 
to those kneeling. Of interest for present purposes is the interpretive route that 
Chief Justice Dickson took in narrowing the scope of the provision such that the 
appellants’ activity did not fall within the section:
If “disturb” ... is taken to encompass annoyance, anxiety or emotional upset, then 
“anything”, no matter how trivial, which would lead to such annoyance, anxiety 
or emotional upset would be caught by the provision: a man might be convicted 
99. Amnon Rubinstein, Jurisdiction and Illegality: A Study in Public Law (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1965) at 16.
100. Fraternité des policiers et policières de la MRC des Collines-de-l’Outaouais c Collines-de-
l’Outaouais (MRC des), 2010 QCCA 816 at para 27, 4 Admin LR (5th) 74, Morissette JA 
[Fraternité des policiers]. See also Stéphane Beaulac, Handbook on Statutory Interpretation: 
General Methodology, Canadian Charter and International Law (Markham: Lexis Nexis, 2008) 
at 14-15; JA Corry, “Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes” (1936) 1 UTLJ 
286 at 290-91; Hogg, supra note 13 at 163. 
101. [1985] 1 SCR 106, SCJ No 6 (QL).
102. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 176(3).
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under the section for failing to take his hat off  in church, or failing to keep it on 
in synagogue.103 
What is striking here is that an appreciation of the factual consequences 
of the interpretation of a statutory provision exerted a signifi cant eff ect on the 
Court’s determination of what was ostensibly a legal question. Even the distinction 
between “law” and “fact,” which is so intuitively clear, seems to become blurred 
upon closer examination.104
Moreover, neither administrative decision makers nor courts employ the ostensibly 
neat distinction between law, fact, and mixed law and fact. At the very least, “the three 
‘stages’ of the process do not in practice occur consecutively or even separately.”105 
Indeed, given that courts do not consciously employ such a rigid reasoning process, “it 
would be strange if reviewing courts insisted on the division being rigidly maintained 
by administrative tribunals when it is not maintained by superior courts presided over 
by highly skilled lawyers.”106 Th is should come as no surprise:
Perplexing problems may … arise in analysing the nature of the process by which a 
tribunal determines whether a factual situation falls within or without the limits of a 
category or standard prescribed by a statute or other legal instrument. Every fi nding by 
a tribunal postulates a process of abstraction and inference, which may be conditioned 
solely by the adjudicator’s practical experience and knowledge of aff airs, or partly or 
wholly by his knowledge of legal principle. He hears evidence and, by satisfying himself 
as to its reliability, fi nds what were the “true” facts; it may then be necessary for him to 
draw a series of inferences from these primary fi ndings in order to determine what were 
the material facts on which he has to base his decision; in order to draw certain of these 
inferences correctly he may need to apply his knowledge of legal rules. At what point 
does an inference drawn from facts become an inference of law? Is the application of 
a statutory norm to the material facts always to be classifi ed as the determination of a 
question of law? And where in this spectrum lie questions of policy?107
 
103. Ibid at para 36.
104. It could be that any application of the ‘consequential analysis’ tool of statutory interpretation 
would raise the same questions, but the problem is particularly pressing when a decision 
maker has been charged both with fi nding facts and interpreting legal provisions: It is hardly 
a stretch to posit that the meaning given to the statutory provisions will be infl uenced by the 
facts as found in the particular case, and the process of fi nding them. 
105. Emery, supra note 96 at 615. See also Susan L Gratton, “Standing at the Divide: Th e 
Relationship Between Administrative Law and the Charter post-Multani” (2008) 53:3 
McGill LJ 477 at 485-87. 
106. Rubinstein, supra note 99 at 40.
107. SA De Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 5th ed by Lord Woolf & Jeff rey Jowell 
(London, UK: Sweet and Maxwell, 1995) at 277.
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Given that confusion is inevitable and explanation is diffi  cult, an analysis based 
on ostensibly neat categories of law, fact, and mixed law and fact risks undermining 
the autonomy of administrative decision makers. Without explaining its reasoning 
process, a court following a categorical approach can characterize a question as one of 
law, thereby requiring intrusive judicial review. Neat questions of law, however, do not 
arise with suffi  cient clarity to justify vesting such strong discretion in reviewing courts.108
Previously, the Court was sceptical about an approach that relied on 
distinctions between law, fact, and mixed law and fact, holding that “[t]here is no 
clear line to be drawn between questions of law and questions of fact, and, in any 
event, many determinations involve questions of mixed law and fact.”109 Justice 
Iac obucci put the point forcefully in Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, 
Competition Act) v Southam Inc:110 “[T]he distinction between law on the one 
hand and mixed law and fact on the other is diffi  cult. On occasion, what appears 
to be mixed law and fact turns out to be law, or vice versa.”111 No philosop hical 
revolution has occurred in the years since those observations were made; the 
ostensibly neat distinctions remain nebulous. Worse, because of the vague nature 
of the distinctions, they are incapable of functioning as a means of allocating 
authority between administrative decision makers and reviewing courts. Indeed, 
they are an inappropriate means of doing so because they mask reviewing courts’ 
true reasons for decision: “[D]istinctions between law, fact, and policy, acquire 
a concrete content only in relation to specifi c instances of administrative action, 
where they refl ect the court’s conclusions about the most appropriate division of 
responsibility between court and agency in all the circumstances.”112 Underpinnin g the 
categories developed by the Court are numerous assumptions about the appropriate 
allocation of interpretive responsibility. For example, there is the assumption that legal 
questions should be placed solely in the domain of courts. But the development and 
use of the categories masks these assumptions. Th at those assumptions may present a 
quiet departure from a deferential and substance-based approach should cause concern.
108. See also Heckman, supra note 78 at 77-82. Heckman criticizes the “legal centrism” of the 
category of questions of general law and suggests that its scope should be narrowed.
109. Pushpanathan, supra note 24 at para 37. See also Baker, supra note 58 at paras 53-55.
110. Southam, supra note 23. 
111. Ibid at para 35. 
112. TRS Allan, “Constitutional Dialogue and the Justifi cation of Judicial Review” (2003) 23:4 
Oxford J Legal Stud 563 at 570. See also Mark Aronson, “Unreasonableness and Error of 
Law” (2001) 24 UNSWLJ 315; GL Peiris, “Jurisdictional Review and Judicial Policy: Th e 
Evolving Mosaic” (1987) 103 Law Q Rev 66 at 94-95.
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B. JURISDICTION113
As Justice Frankfurter once sagely observed, “‘Jurisdiction’ competes with 
‘right’ as one of the most deceptive of legal pitfalls.”114 In this section, I equate 
jurisdiction with an administrative decision maker’s power to take a decision. 
What I am most interested in are situations in which an administrative decision 
maker claims or relies on a power, the existence or legitimate exercise of which 
is subsequently contested before a reviewing court. A fi nding adverse to the 
administrative decision maker will lead to the conclusion that it committed a 
jurisdictional error by acting ultra vires its statutory authority.
Th e so-called ultra vires doctrine sought to anchor the justifi cation for judicial 
review by anchoring it to legislative intent.115 Th e ultra vires doctrine is associated 
with what came to be the orthodox conception of jurisdiction in administrative 
law.116 Th e starting point is that the powers of administrative decision makers are 
necessarily limited. As Justice Beetz once explained, “any grant of jurisdiction will 
necessarily include limits to the jurisdiction granted.”117 Accordingly, if a statute 
provides that a decision maker can do Y only if X is present, then the presence 
of X is a pre-condition to the doing of Y. To take a familiar example, a tribunal 
granted the power to make fi ndings of discrimination in respect of the letting of 
self-contained dwelling units can only make a fi nding of discrimination (Y) if a 
given premises is a self-contained dwelling unit (X).118 Here, the existence of X is a 
pre-condition to the doing of Y. Moreover, it can be said that, by conditioning the 
doing of Y on the existence of X, the legislature intended to limit the jurisdiction 
of the administrative decision maker. By policing these limits, a reviewing court 
is simply giving eff ect to legislative intent:   
[Jurisdictional facts] were to be distinguished from facts on which fi ndings were 
conclusive only by the legislature’s having marked them out as condition-forming 
facts; that is statutory language must show that these facts had actually to exist before 
the tribunal whose powers were being defi ned could have conditional jurisdiction.119 
113. Th is section draws heavily on (and revises for a Canadian audience) arguments I fi rst 
formulated in Daly, Th eory of Deference, supra note 4 at 221-33.
114. Yonkers v United States, 320 US 685 at 695, 64 S Ct 327 (1944).
115. See generally Tremblay, supra note 12.
116. See generally Paul Craig, “Ultra Vires and the Foundations of Judicial Review” (1998) 57:1 
Cambridge LJ 63. 
117. Bibeault, supra note 22 at para 118.
118. See Bell, supra note 9. See also R v London (City of ) Rent Tribunal, Ex parte Honig, [1951] 1 
KB 641, 1 All ER 195; R (A) v Croydon London Borough Council, [2009] UKSC 8, 1 WLR 
2557 [Croydon].
119. DM Gordon, “Conditional or Contingent Jurisdiction of Tribunals” (1960) 1:2 UBC L Rev 
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On the ort hodox view of the ultra vires doctrine, it falls to the reviewing 
court to determine whether the conditions for jurisdiction have been satisfi ed: 
“the fact must exist in the opinion of the reviewing court.”120 Canadian co urts 
have preferred to label this as the “preliminary question doctrine.”121 Th ey have good 
reason for doing so; at its outer limits, the preliminary question doctrine also applies 
to any questions of law said to have been interpreted by an administrative 
decision maker.122
Unfortunately, no formula has ever been devised for distinguishing X from Y. 
S.A. De Smith’s words ring as true today as they did decades ago: “No satisfactory 
test has ever been formulated for distinguishing fi ndings which go to jurisdiction 
from fi ndings which go to the merits.”123 Th e problem is that all statutory provisions 
can be cast in the following basic form: If X is present, then the decision maker shall 
or may Y; if a majority of employees are members of a trade union, the Board may 
accredit it. In other words, X and Y are “inextricably interwoven.”124 As with the 
ostensibly neat distinctions between law, fact, and mixed law and fact, the eff ect of 
the inevitable uncertainty125 is to leave courts with strong discretion as to when to 
intervene: “Th e risk, of course, is that all a court need do to avoid the deferential 
standard of review … is to classify a provision as one that goes to jurisdiction.”126 
Th eir interventions would necessarily be based on considerations external to the 
preliminary question doctrine. As one commentator has observed, the preliminary 
question doctrine that the Court followed in the mid-twentieth century was 
“so malleable as to be capable of justifying the inclusion within its reach of any 
question of law or mixed law and fact that a tribunal was called upon to decide 
in the exercise of its mandate.”127 Th e Court’s response was quite sensible, as the 
185 at 197 [emphasis added].
120. Hogg, “Jurisdictional Fact Doctrine,” supra note 13 at 210.
121. For a recent example, see Halifax (Regional Municipality) v Nova Scotia (Human Rights 
Commission), 2012 SCC 10 at para 34, 1 SCR 364 [Halifax].
122. BC Gould, “Anisminic and Jurisdictional Review” [1970] PL 358.
123. Supra note 107 at 255. See also Jaff e, supra note 97 at 959. 
124. Paul Craig, “Jurisdiction, Judicial Control, and Agency Autonomy” in Ian Loveland, ed, 
A Special Relationship? American Infl uences on Public Law in the United Kingdom (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995) 173 at 177.
125. See Craig, Administrative Law, supra note 6 at 441. See similarly William Wade, 
“Constitutional and Administrative Aspects of the Anisminic Case” (1969) 85:338 Law Q 
Rev 198 at 210-11.
126. National Corn Growers Association v Canada (Import Tribunal), [1990] 2 SCR 1324 at para 
23, SCJ no 110 (QL), Wilson J, concurring.
127. David Mullan, “Th e Supreme Court of Canada and Tribunals – Deference to the 
Administrative Process: A Recent Phenomenon or a Return to Basics?” (2001) 80 Can Bar 
Rev 399 at 423. See also JM Evans, “Developments in Administrative Law: Th e 1984-1985 
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preliminary question doctrine was swallowed up by the standard of review analysis. 
Justice Beetz wrote in Union des employés de service, local 298 v Bibeault:128
Th e concept of the preliminary or collateral question diverts the courts from the real 
problem of judicial review: it substitutes the question “Is this a preliminary or collateral 
question to the exercise of the tribunal’s power?” for the only question which should be 
asked, “Did the legislator intend the question to be within the jurisdiction conferred 
on the tribunal?” Th e chief problem in a case of judicial review is determining the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal whose decision is impugned. Th e courts, including this 
Court, have often remarked on the diffi  culty of the task. I doubt whether it is possible 
to state a simple and precise rule for identifying a question of jurisdiction, given the 
fl uidity of the concept of jurisdiction and the many ways in which jurisdiction is 
conferred on administrative tribunals.129
Justice Beetz’s retention of the language of jurisdiction may have preserved 
the attraction of the preliminary question doctrine for litigants and judges, but 
his development of the standard of review analysis undermined the doctrine. 
An entirely new approach was to be taken, pursuant to which a reviewing court 
would not parse a decision for jurisdictional errors or a statute for jurisdictional 
limitations. Rather than relying on the preliminary question doctrine to classify 
questions as jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional, reviewing courts would 
attempt to give eff ect to legislative intent. Th e development of a competing 
approach sounded the death knell for the preliminary question doctrine. Th e 
Court eventually said that the standard of review analysis “must be applied even 
to those provisions which appear to limit a tribunal’s jurisdiction.”130 In Crevier 
v Québec (Attorney General),131 the Court had held that the Constitution requires 
that judicial review be available to keep decision makers within limits prescribed 
by legislatures. However, insofar as this could be described as jurisdictional review, 
it came to refer to questions which, according to the outcome of the standard 
of review analysis, were to be reviewed on a standard of review of correctness. 
Jurisdiction, then, became a label to describe the results of the standard of review 
analysis and not itself a key component in the analysis132—a label, but one prone 
Term” (1986) 8:1 Sup Ct L Rev 1 at 27-28.
128. Supra note 22. Cf. Beetz J’s earlier position in Canada Labour Relations Board, supra note 22 
at 441.
129. Bibeault, ibid at paras 120-21.
130. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 301 v Montréal (City), [1997] 1 SCR 793 at para 
44, SCJ No 39 (QL), L’Heureux-Dubé J. 
131. Supra note 2. For criticism see HW Arthurs, “Protection against Judicial Review” (1983) 
43:2 R du B 277.
132. See Pushpanathan, supra note 24 at para 30. See also Th e Honourable Michel Bastarache, 
(2012) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL340
to “analytical emptiness.”133 It certainly did not follow from the Court’s logic in 
Crevier that the preliminary question doctrine, or anything like it, would have 
to be employed by reviewing courts, for all Crevier did was to “entrench ... some 
degree of review.”134
Th e multiplicity of diffi  culties attendant upon the use of the traditional 
conception of jurisdiction can be avoided by requiring a holistic inquiry into 
legislative intent. Such an inquiry focuses on the substance of the statutory 
provisions at issue. A judge following such an approach does not read a statute with 
a formal conception of jurisdictional questions in his or her mind. A reviewing 
court’s decision to label a question as jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional should 
never fully answer the question of the appropriate degree of deference to accord 
because the concept of jurisdiction gives little or no guidance as to legislative 
intent. Th e very genius of the standard of review analysis was to recognize this 
fl aw and avoid it. Th e concept of jurisdiction always remains relevant in the sense 
that decision makers cannot exercise unlimited power.135 But the boundaries of 
jurisdiction can be marked by the concept of unreasonableness; outside those 
boundaries, a decision could be struck down as unlawful, thereby securing some 
measure of judicial review. 
 In Public Service Alliance of Canada v Canadian Federal Pilots Association,136 
Justice Evans attempted to narrow the category of jurisdictional questions 
established by Dunsmuir almost out of existence. In light of the diffi  culties that 
“Modernizing Judicial Review” (2009) 22 Can J Admin L & Prac 227 at 231-34; 
Huscroft, supra note 28 at 296-97. But cf. e.g. Chieu v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), 2002 SCC 3 at para 24, 1 SCR 84, Iacobucci J. Iacobucci J evidences, perhaps, 
the lure of the traditional conception of jurisdiction: “Administrative bodies generally must 
be correct in determining the scope of their delegated mandate, given that they are entirely 
the creatures of statute.” He perhaps also evidences the lure of the strict approach taken to 
review of jurisdictional determinations made by municipalities. See e.g. United Taxi Drivers’ 
Fellowship of Southern Alberta v Calgary (City), 2004 SCC 19, 1 SCR 485.
133. Public Service Alliance of Canada v Canadian Federal Pilots Association, 2009 FCA 223 at 
para 40, [2010] 3 FCR 219, Evans JA [Federal Pilots Association]. See also Alberta Teachers’ 
Association, supra note 56.
134. Julius H Grey, “Sections 96 to 100: A Defense”  (1985) 1 Admin LJ 3 at 11. See also 
Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) v Canadian National Railway Co, [1998] 4 FC 506 at 
para 11, FCJ No 1164 (QL). Strayer JA writes, “A reasonableness test, even on fi ndings of 
jurisdictional fact, should provide adequate judicial control to avoid arbitrary or capricious 
determinations in support of the assertion of jurisdiction.”
135. See Roncarelli v Duplessis, [1959] SCR 121, SCJ No 1 (QL).
136. Supra note 133.
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I have described with the formal conception of jurisdiction, I must agree in 
principle with Justice Evans’s admonition that 
it is too late in the development of administrative law in Canada for an applicant 
to invoke the ghost of jurisdiction past to inveigle the Court into reviewing for 
correctness a tribunal’s interpretation of a provision in its enabling statute, without 
subjecting it to a standard of review analysis.137 
I admire Justice Evans’s evident distaste for the formal conception of 
jurisdiction. However, I must respectfully disagree with his conclusion that an 
applicant can establish that a decision maker has “exceeded its jurisdiction” only 
by demonstrating that the decision maker’s interpretation “was unreasonable.”138 
For good or ill, the Court expressly established a category of “true questions of 
jurisdiction or vires” in Dunsmuir. However, there are signs that Justice Evans’s 
criticisms have had their intended eff ect. In Alberta Teachers’ Association,139  Justice 
Rothstein, for the majority of the Court, indicated openness to the argument that 
the category of jurisdictional questions should be abolished entirely.140 Indeed, 
the Court has very recently gone so far as to overturn its decision in Bell v Ontario 
(Human Rights Commission),141 noting that the whole notion of “preliminary 
questions” central to the reasoning in Bell “has long since been abandoned.”142  
One hopes the Court will indeed take the step of abolishing the category of 
jurisdictional questions, but until it has done so, the formal conception of 
jurisdiction is not a ghost.
In summary, reliance on “law” and “jurisdiction” as the cornerstone of 
judicial review doctrine will cause Canada’s administrative law superstructure to 
shift, bend, and creak. Th e categories are underpinned by hidden assumptions 
that do not support the deferential approach advocated by the Court. Th ese 
assumptions are that reviewing courts should be able to intervene to correct 
jurisdictional errors and errors in answering general questions of law. However, 
no normative basis has been off ered in Dunsmuir or other recent decisions in 
support of such an interventionist stance.143 Simply classifying questions as ones 
of law or jurisdiction is insuffi  cient and masks rather than explains the content 
137. Ibid at 52. See also Canada (Attorney General) v Public Service Alliance of Canada, 2011 FCA 
257 at para 30, FCJ No 1325 (QL).
138. Federal Pilots Association, supra note 133 at para 50.
139. Alberta Teachers’ Association, supra note 56.
140. Ibid at para 42.
141. Supra note 9.
142. Halifax, supra note 121. 
143. Th e impossibility of providing such normative basis is discussed elsewhere. See Daly, Th eory 
of Deference, supra note 4, ch 6.
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of the concepts. Such shaky foundations do not augur well for an attempt to 
construct a relationship between courts and administrative decision makers that 
serves the needs of judicial review in the modern state.
V. ARE THE CATEGORIES COHERENT?
Quite apart from the diffi  culties identifi ed in the previous section, the categories 
themselves are both over- and under-inclusive. I contend that this is a signifi cant 
problem with the categorical approach. If a categorical approach is to be adopted, 
it is important that the categories are appropriately tailored. It is ever more im-
portant given the Court’s equivocation as to what is required to move a particular 
decision out of one category and into another. 
A. OVER-INCLUSIVENESS
1. QUESTIONS OF LAW IN HOME STATUTE
According deference to decision makers’ interpretations of their home statutes 
carries signifi cant appeal. Relative to a reviewing court staff ed by generalists, a 
specialist administrative decision maker will often be better able to develop an 
interpretation of law that coheres with the principles and policies underpinning 
the statute.But to state as a rule that such interpretations should be reviewed on a 
reasonableness standard goes too far.144 
Th ere may be questions relating to the decision maker’s home statute that 
are general in nature and thus not appropriate candidates for deference. As 
Justice Cromwell pointedly observed in Alberta Teachers’ Association,145 there may 
be questions relating to the home statute which should be subject to review for 
correctness: “[T]here are legal questions in ‘home’ statutes whose resolution the 
legislature did not intend to leave to the tribunal; indeed, it is hard to imagine 
where else the limits of a tribunal’s delegated power are more likely to be set out.”146
144. Indeed, it is not clear that one can take the Court literally on this point. See Alliance 
Pipeline, supra note 59 at para 85. As Deschamps J observed in Alliance Pipeline, in 
respect of the language used in Dunsmuir, “the language could be read broadly to capture 
any instance when the administrative decision-maker is interpreting its home statute; 
however, this interpretation does not sit well with any of the previous grounds that this 
Court has advanced for according deference.” Binnie J has expressed similar concerns. See 
his concurring reasons in Alberta Teachers’ Association, supra note 56 at paras 48, 81-83. 
Ultimately, he seemed to provoke the majority of the Court into accepting his position that 
deference to interpretations of home statutes should not be automatic.
145. Supra note 56.
146. Ibid at para 99.
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Th e approach of the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada (Attorney General) 
v Mowat147 is instructive (though not authoritative in its result, as the Court took 
a diff erent view on appeal in Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v 
Canada (Attorney General)).148 Here, the question was whether the Canadian 
Human Rights Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) had the power to award legal costs to 
a successful complainant under its authority to make awards in respect of “any 
expenses incurred by the victim as a result of the discriminatory practice.”149 Th e 
Tribunal concluded that it had such power. On review by the Federal Court, a 
standard of reasonableness was applied to the Tribunal’s interpretation. However, 
the Federal Court of Appeal applied a standard of correctness. Justice Layden-
Stevenson held that the question at issue had no factual component and required 
no human rights expertise; rather, the Tribunal had to determine a “pure question 
of law, specifi cally, one that determines the bounds of its authority,” in respect of 
which it had “no institutional or experiential advantage over the Court and [was] no 
better positioned than the Court.”150 Although the Court took a diff erent view of the 
appropriate standard of review in the circumstances,151 the general approach seems 
analytically sound and may well fi nd adherents in future cases.152 
Moreover, as Justice Deschamps pointed out in her concurring reasons in 
Alliance Pipeline, the decision maker might not necessarily have more expertise than 
the reviewing court relative to the question at issue:
Such a position is purely formalistic and loses sight of the rationale for according 
deference to an interpretation of the home statute that has developed in the 
jurisprudence including Dunsmuir, namely, that the legislature has manifested an 
intent to draw on the relative expertise or experience of the administrative body to 
resolve the interpretative issues before it. Such intent cannot simply be presumed 
from the creation of an administrative body by the legislature. Rather, courts should 
look to the jurisprudence or to the enabling statute to determine whether it is 
established in a satisfactory manner that the decision-maker actually has a particular 
familiarity—or put another way, particular expertise or experience relative to a 
court—with respect to interpreting its home statute.153
To develop a formal category of decisions to which reasonableness review 
applies is to disregard the substance of the individual decisions said to fall 
147. 2009 FCA 309, [2010] 4 FCR 579 [Mowat].
148. Supra note 59.
149. Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6, ss 53(2)(c-d).
150. Mowat, supra note 147 at paras 43-44.
151. Th e court purported to apply the categorical approach in reaching this conclusion but in 
reality it relied on the standard of review analysis factors.
152. See e.g. Martinez-Caro v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 640, FCJ No 881 (QL).
153. Alliance Pipeline, supra note 59 at para 100.
(2012) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL344
within the category. Moreover, one might observe, just because a decision maker 
has expertise, it does not follow that the expertise was actually applied to the 
decision in question;154 if it was, a more deferential standard of review will be 
appropriate.155 A reviewing court following a holistic approach, such as the 
standard of review analysis, can be alive to the possibility that expertise was not 
applied in a particular case. A reviewing court conducting a formalistic analysis 
of whether a decision falls into a particular category cannot be so alive. Justice 
Deschamps’s concerns are well-founded.
2. QUESTIONS OF FACT AND OF MIXED LAW AND FACT
Th e same objections apply to the categories of questions of fact as well as 
mixed law and fact. It is overwhelmingly likely that reasonableness will be the 
appropriate standard of review of such decisions. Th e Court has been clear 
that factual determinations “command a high degree of deference.”156 Indeed, 
traditionally “the courts have been very slow to accept as a matter of theory or 
policy that ‘pure’ errors of fact should be open to supervision.”157 Administrators’ 
closeness to and familiarity with factual matters within their bailiwick, allied to 
the fear of fl oodgates being burst open by waves of applications for review of 
contentious factual matters, probably explain this judicial reticence.
However, there may be factual determinations in respect of which a 
reviewing court would be as well or even better placed to give the best answer. A 
recent English example may be of assistance. In R (A) v Croydon London Borough 
Council,158 the question was whether a local authority or a court should decide 
if an individual is a “child” for the purposes of section 20(1) of the Children Act 
1989.159 Th is legislation confers numerous powers and imposes numerous duties 
on the courts and local authorities, contingent upon a fi nding that a person is a 
child. But the question of who is a “child” can be diffi  cult to answer, particularly 
154. See generally Lorne Sossin, “Empty Ritual, Mechanical Exercise or the Discipline of 
Diff erence? Revisiting the Standard of Review in Administrative Law” (2003) 27:4 
Advocates’ Q 478.
155. Th is is analogous to cases in which a decision maker’s expertise is simply not relevant to a 
question it has attempted to answer. See e.g. Elgie v Alberta (Workers’ Compensation, Appeals 
Commission), 2009 ABCA 277 at paras 32, 34, 311 DLR (4th) 503.
156. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at para 46, [2009] 1 SCR 339 [Khosa].
157. Christopher Forsyth & Emma Dring, “Th e Final Frontier: Th e Emergence of Material Error of 
Fact as a Ground of Judicial Review” in Christopher Forsyth et al, eds, Eff ective Judicial Review: 
A Cornerstone of Good Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 245 at 249.
158. Supra note 118.
159. (UK), 1989, c 41.
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in situations where the circumstances of an individual’s birth have, for whatever 
reason, not been adequately documented. Section 20(1) obliges local authorities 
to provide accommodation for “any child in need within their area.”160 Th e local 
authority argued that the judgment of “need” must be an evaluative one and that 
an appropriate judgment could be made only by the local authority’s staff , who 
possessed the relevant expertise. On this view, judicial review would be available, 
but the primary decision would be for the local authority. Th is argument did not 
fi nd favour with Lady Hale, who instead drew a distinction between the objective 
factual question of “what is a child” and the evaluative factual question of “what is 
a child in need”:
Th e arguments advanced by [the local authority] might have to provide an answer 
in cases where Parliament has not made its intentions plain. But in this case it 
appears to me that Parliament has done just that. In section 20(1) a clear distinction 
is drawn between the question whether there is a “child in need within their area” 
and the question whether it appears to the local authority that the child requires 
accommodation for one of the listed reasons. In section 17(10) a clear distinction is 
drawn between whether the person is a “child” and whether that child is to be “taken 
to be” in need within the meaning of the Act. “Taken to be” imports an element 
of judgment ... which Parliament may well have intended to be left to the local 
authority rather than the courts.161
It is striking that Lady Hale was so exercised by the intricacies of the statutory 
regime. She parsed the statute in a search for the intention of the legislature, 
not for jurisdictional limitations. Equally striking was her subsequent insistence 
that questions of relative expertise were relevant to determining legislative 
intent. Lady Hale acknowledged that the question of whether an individual 
was a “child” or not might often be a diffi  cult one, but held that the courts are 
suffi  ciently adept at answering such questions. What is true of determining an 
individual’s age “is true of many questions of fact which regularly come before 
the courts. Th at does not prevent them from being questions for the courts rather 
than for other kinds of decision makers.”162 Deference to administrative decision 
makers on questions of fact will not, on Lady Hale’s approach, automatically 
be appropriate. An analysis of the statutory scheme and the relative expertise 
of the bodies involved will be necessary before a conclusion can be reached on 
the allocation of authority.
160. Ibid, s 20(1).
161. Croydon, supra note 118 at 28.
162. Ibid at 27.
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A conclusion like the one reached by the UK Supreme Court in Croydon 
may be rare, but in principle, it can occur. If, in principle, such an outcome can 
occur in respect of factual determinations, where deference is most likely to be 
appropriate, then it is a fortiori capable of occurring in respect of determinations 
of mixed fact and law. In short, a standard of review of reasonableness will not 
always be appropriate. 
3. GENERAL QUESTIONS OF LAW
On the correctness side of the post-Dunsmuir ledger, the categories are also over-
inclusive. In respect of general questions of law, a decision maker may be more 
expert than a reviewing court—especially given the expansion of that category 
in Alliance Pipeline.163 For example, the question at issue in Metropolitan Life—
what constituted membership of a trade union—could easily be said to be a 
question of general law that is of central importance to the legal system.164 Th e 
phrase “members of a trade union” appears in federal legislation and in numerous 
provincial statutes.165 
However, a large part of the reason that Metropolitan Life is now treated with 
such disdain166 is that this is precisely the sort of question on which a labour relations 
board could easily be said to have more expertise than a generalist reviewing court.167 
First, a labour relations board will address such questions on a regular basis and, 
being staff ed by experts in the fi eld, will have an advantage relative to a court in 
determining which approach to take to the question of membership to best achieve 
its statutory objectives. Second, diff erent labour relations boards can justifi ably take 
diff erent approaches to the question of membership; it is not self-evident that the 
same conditions will be present in both Alberta and Newfoundland, and diff erent 
policies may be required to respond to the complexities present in diff erent 
jurisdictions. Th ird, as practices in the labour relations community change, it may 
be prudent for labour relations boards to change their policies, perhaps with input 
from employer and employee representatives, a possibility foreclosed by national 
resolution of the question of membership. 
163. See text accompanying supra note 74.
164. Equally, of course, it could be said to be an interpretation of a home statute; as I will 
demonstrate below, there will often be such confl ict between the categories.
165. See e.g. Trade Unions Act, RSC 1985, c T-14, ss 4(1)(a), 6; Labour Relations Act, RSNL 1990, 
c L-1, ss 70(7)(b), 70(8), 128(1); Labour Relations Code, RSA 2000, c L-1, ss 29(1), 85(a), 
92(3), 151(d), 151(e), 202(1), 203.
166. See text accompanying supra note 81.
167. Paul C Weiler, “Th e ‘Slippery Slope’ of Judicial Intervention: Th e Supreme Court and 
Canadian Labour Relations 1950-1970” (1971) 9:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 1 at 2-4.
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Th ese considerations might be unique to the labour relations context, but 
similar ones can be expected to arise in other areas.168 If the approach taken in 
Metropolitan Life is indeed now considered to be bad law, if not “pure nonsense,”169 
it is troubling that the Court’s categorization eff orts threaten to usher it back into 
Canadian judicial review doctrine. Some of these concerns are assuaged by the 
attitude that the Court took in Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc v Manitoba 
Association of Health Care Professionals170 to the application of the common law 
concept of estoppel by a labour arbitrator. In this case, the Court held that a 
reasonableness standard was appropriate. However, Justice Fish’s reasoning was 
heavily contingent on the characteristics of the labour arbitrator,171 which opens 
up the unhappy prospect that the “pure nonsense” represented by Metropolitan 
Life might be acceptable outside the labour relations context.
4. JURISDICTIONAL QUESTIONS
Th e scope of the category of true questions of jurisdiction, or vires, is uncertain. 
In Dunsmuir, Justices Bastarache and LeBel insisted—repeating Chief Justice 
Dickson’s admonition in New Brunswick Liquor—that “[t]hese questions will 
be narrow … reviewing judges must not brand as jurisdictional issues that are 
doubtfully so.”172 In Alberta Teachers’ Association173 Justice Rothstein suggested 
that, at best, such questions would be “exceptional.”174 Nevertheless, even a 
narrow category of “true” questions has the potential to include too many 
administrative decisions.
A decision maker’s expertise may often be relevant in answering jurisdictional 
questions. It is likely that a decision maker will be more familiar than a reviewing 
court with the contours of the relevant regulatory domain and the areas in which 
the decision maker could usefully and appropriately exercise its powers.175 Th us, 
it was shrewd of Justice Abella to advise in Council of Canadians with Disabilities 
v VIA Rail Canada176  that courts should “refrain from overlooking the expertise 
168. See e.g. New Brunswick (Human Rights Commission) v Potash Corp of Saskatchewan Inc, 2006 
NBCA 74 at para 61, 271 DLR (4th) 483.
169. Supra note 167 at 32.
170. Supra note 59.
171. Ibid at paras 45-53.
172. Dunsmuir, supra note 21 at para 59. See similarly Khosa, supra note 156 at para 45.
173. Alberta Teachers’ Association, supra note 56.
174. Ibid at para 39.
175. See e.g. Quincy M Crawford “Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretations that Delimit the 
Scope of the Agency’s Jurisdiction” (1994) 61:3 U Chicago L Rev 957 at 981.
176. 2007 SCC 15, 1 SCR 650.
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a tribunal may bring to the exercise of interpreting its enabling legislation and 
defi ning the scope of its statutory authority.”177 
Such a nuanced method is ruled out by the categorical approach. Again, one 
of the categories turns out to be over-inclusive. However, at least here the bell 
may be tolling for the category of true questions of jurisdiction or vires, judging 
by the Court’s treatment of it in Alberta Teachers’ Association.178 If this category is 
indeed jettisoned, its over-inclusiveness will go with it.
B. UNDER-INCLUSIVENESS 
Th e categories are also under-inclusive in important respects. Deference for a 
wider range of administrative decisions than that envisaged by the categories is 
appropriate. Most obviously, an administrative decision maker may be better able 
to resolve questions of general law and jurisdictional questions than a reviewing 
court would be. Th is implies that limiting the categories of decision to which 
deference should be accorded to factual questions, questions of mixed fact and 
law, and interpretations of a decision maker’s home statute is inappropriate. 
Similarly, deference may also be appropriate regarding questions that appear to 
be jurisdictional in nature. Simply put, the categories are under-inclusive because 
they do not capture the full range of decisions on which a standard of review of 
reasonableness would be appropriate.
VI. CONFLICT BETWEEN THE CATEGORIES179
It follows from the argument up to this point that there is a serious potential 
for confl ict between the categories. Th e Court’s recent decisions provide ample 
demonstration that this potential for confl ict has been realized. 
Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney 
General), 180 discussed above, provides a fi rst example. Recall that the Federal 
Court of Appeal held that the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal was not entitled 
to deference even though it was interpreting a provision in its home statute, 
because the question of whether the Tribunal had the power to award costs was a 
question of general law. But following the categorical approach, it is diffi  cult to 
177. Ibid at para 89 [emphasis added].
178. Alberta Teachers’ Association, supra note 56.
179. Th e argument in this section draws in part on the more complete descriptions of the cases 
provided in Paul Daly, “Dunsmuir’s Flaws Exposed: Recent Decisions on Standard of Review” 
(2012) 58:2 McGill LJ 1.
180. Supra note 59.
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see how the question at issue should be categorized. On the one hand, it clearly 
relates to an interpretation of the decision maker’s home statute. But on the other 
hand, it could be categorized as a question of general law: Many decision makers 
would be interested in the scope of their authority to award costs to successful 
claimants or participants.181 
At the Supreme Court of Canada, the confl ict between the categories was 
ultimately resolved by reference to factors external to the categories. For the Court, 
Justices LeBel and Cromwell held that determining whether legal costs could 
be awarded in such circumstances fell “within the core function and expertise” 
of the Tribunal182 because it was “inextricably intertwined with the Tribunal’s 
mandate and expertise to make factual fi ndings relating to discrimination.”183 
Th ey noted that the Tribunal was in a good position to assess the need to award 
costs in particular cases that came before it.184 Finally, they emphasized that the 
question required a fact-sensitive inquiry. 185 In other words, to determine the 
appropriate standard of review, Justices LeBel and Cromwell employed factors 
from the standard of review analysis: expertise, the factual nature of the question, 
and the purpose of the statutory provision in question.186
A second example is Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc v Manitoba 
Association of Health Care Professionals.187 At issue here was a labour arbitrator’s 
interpretation of a collective agreement. Th e union had abided for many years by 
the employer’s interpretation of a provision relating to eligibility for additional 
paid leave but eventually grieved the interpretation. Th e arbitrator decided that 
the employer’s interpretation was incorrect, but that the union, by virtue of its 
many years of acquiescence, was estopped from challenging it. Th e courts below 
were split on the appropriate standard of review. On the one hand, as the Manitoba 
Court of Appeal held, estoppel is a common law principle. It is a question of 
general law beyond the expertise of labour arbitrators and appropriately subject 
to judicial oversight on a correctness standard.188 On the other hand, applying a 
concept such as estoppel in the particular context of labour relations unavoidably 
181. See e.g. Kelly v Alberta (Energy Resources Conservation Board), 2012 ABCA 19, Alta LR (5th) 391.
182. Canadian Human Rights Commission, supra note 59 at para 25.
183. Ibid. 
184. Ibid.
185. Ibid at para 26.
186. See similarly Canada (Attorney General) v Tipple, 2011 FC 762 at paras 27-35, 91 CCEL 
(3d) 132.
187. Supra note 59. 
188. Manitoba Association of Health Care Professionals v Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc, 
2010 MBCA 55 at para 46, 255 Man R (2d) 93.
(2012) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL350
raises interlocking issues of fact and policy, features that support the decision of 
the judge at fi rst instance to apply a standard of review of reasonableness.189 
Th e Court was unanimous in concluding that a standard of reasonableness 
ought to apply. Th e unique position of labour arbitrators was central to the 
conclusion. Justice Fish noted that labour arbitrators operate under broad 
statutory and contractual mandates. Th is breadth is necessary to allow them to 
fulfi ll the diffi  cult role of mediating between management and labour in order to 
foster industrial peace. Th e generosity of their mandates is also appropriate given 
their expertise in the fi eld of labour relations. Finally, Justice Fish emphasized 
that labour arbitrators are uniquely well positioned to respond to the exigencies 
of the employer-employee relationship.190 Expertise and statutory purpose—
factors drawn from the standard of review analysis—were crucial to Justice Fish’s 
conclusion that a standard of review of reasonableness should be applied. Two 
other factors external to the categorical approach were also relevant: the extent 
of the labour arbitrator’s statutory mandate191 and the complexity of the problem 
underlying the decision in issue.
In Alberta Teachers’ Association,192 the issue was whether the decision maker 
had exercised a power before the expiry of a ninety-day deadline established by 
its home statute. Both of the lower courts accepted that this was a jurisdictional 
question to which the decision maker was obliged to give a correct answer.193 Th e 
Supreme Court of Canada applied a standard of review of reasonableness on the 
basis that the decision maker was interpreting its home statute and thus entitled 
to deference. 
For the majority of the Court, Justice Rothstein held that the decision under 
review did not fall into any of the correctness categories.194 Th e appropriate 
category was that of a decision interpreting the decision maker’s home statute, 
189. Manitoba Association of Health Care Professionals v Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc, 
2009 MBQB 213 at para 11-13, 243 Man R (2d) 281. See further Heckman, supra note 78 
at 73-77.
190. Nor-Man, supra note 59 at 42-53.
191. See also Telfer v Canada (Revenue Agency), 2009 FCA 23 at para 40, 4 CTC 123.
192. Alberta Teachers’ Association, supra note 56.
193. [2008] 21 Alta LR (5th) 24, 1 Admin LR (5th) 85; 2010 ABCA 26 at paras 37-40, 316 DLR 
(4th) 117 (aff ’d).
194. Recall that Rothstein J expressed signifi cant skepticism about the category of “true 
questions of jurisdiction or vires,” announcing himself unable to provide a defi nition. See 
text accompanying supra notes 137-140. Tellingly, he did not explain why the question at 
issue was not a jurisdictional question. Th us only the artful avoidance of a confl ict between 
classifying the relevant issue as a jurisdictional question or an interpretation of a home statute 
prevented the fl aws of the categorical approach from being even more cruelly exposed.
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which attracted a reasonableness standard. However, in determining that the 
question was not one of general law, Justice Rothstein noted that the decision 
was “squarely” within the “specialized expertise” of the decision maker.195 He also 
identifi ed as important the decision maker’s “signifi cant familiarity” with an issue 
“specifi c” to its home statute.196 Finally, he described the decision maker’s role as 
centering upon balancing the rights of individuals to privacy against organizations’ 
needs to disclose information in certain circumstances, necessitating a complex 
process of keeping the interests of the parties in alignment.197 Th e decision on the 
appropriate standard of review was saturated with references to the standard of 
review analysis factors.
It is clear then that in its recent decisions on standard of review the Court 
has relied partly on the standard of review analysis factors 198 and partly on other 
factors such as the breadth of the decision maker’s mandate and the complexity of 
the subject matter of the decision. Provincial courts are not immune.199 Using the 
standard of review analysis in this way might cohere with the Court’s approach 
in Dunsmuir, which marginalized the standard of review analysis but did not 
push it entirely out of the judicial review framework. Th us, despite having been 
marginalized, the standard of review analysis could yet play an important role 
in ensuring that decisions are assigned to the appropriate categories. Of course, 
if the standard of review analysis were to play such a role, the utility of the 
categorical approach would be called into serious question since the standard 
of review analysis would be doing the heavy lifting by placing the decisions in 
the appropriate silo. Why bother at all, then, with a formal approach that lacks 
internal coherence and is not capable of resolving diffi  cult cases? Th at the Court 
has not yet fully thought through its new approach is surely cause for lament. For 
now, the obvious potential for confl ict between the categories suggests that, far 
from laying confusion to rest, the Court has merely relocated it. Any suggestion 
that categorization will lead to a more straightforward body of judicial review law 
looks dubious at best and badly mistaken at worst. 
195. Alberta Teachers’ Association, supra note 56 at para 32.
196. Ibid.
197. Ibid.
198. For some accurate prognostication, see Ron Goltz, “‘Patent Unreasonableness is Dead. And 
We Have Killed It.’ A Critique of the Supreme Court of Canada’s Decision in Dunsmuir” 
(2008) 46:1 Alta L Rev 253.
199. See e.g. Mellor v Saskatchewan (Workers’ Compensation Board), 2012 SKCA 10 at para 20, 385 
Sask R 210. Th e court relied heavily on expertise. See also Syndicat du personnel technique, 
supra note 76 at paras 71-72. Th e court relied on complexity, purpose of the statutory 
provisions, and expertise.
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VII. CATEGORIES AND CONTEXT
An important point about the new standard of review of reasonableness follows 
from the foregoing discussion. Given that the aim of Dunsmuir and its confrères 
seems to be to replace the standard of review analysis with a new categorical 
analysis, it is worth assessing the implications of this change for the second stage 
of the standard of review analysis. As I will suggest, the switch to a categorical 
approach may require the Court to answer a question left tantalizingly unresolved 
by Dunsmuir.
Having had regard in Dunsmuir to the diffi  culties in applying a tripartite 
standard of review, the majority of the Court felt compelled to “conclude that 
the two variants of reasonableness review should be collapsed into a single form 
of ‘reasonableness’ review.”200 Th e correctness standard was untouched, but a 
new, unifi ed standard of reasonableness was announced by Justices Bastarache 
and LeBel. Reasonableness, they explained, is concerned with justifi cation, 
transparency, and intelligibility within the decision-making process as well as with 
whether the decision falls within a range of acceptable and rational solutions.201 
Justice Binnie suggested in his concurring reasons in Dunsmuir that the unifi ed 
standard of reasonableness might contain degrees of deference within it, given 
that “diff erent administrative decisions command diff erent degrees of deference, 
depending on who is deciding what.”202 Later, speaking for the majority of the 
Court in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa,203 Justice Binnie was 
less explicit: “Reasonableness is a single standard that takes its colour from the 
context.”204 
Th e emphasis on the importance of context is sensible as a matter of logic; 
the unifi ed reasonableness standard in Dunsmuir cannot apply itself. Th e range 
of outcomes must be determined by reference to some starting point, as must 
the concrete content of abstract concepts, such as justifi cation, transparency, and 
intelligibility. Th e problem with the Khosa refi nement, however, is that it leaves 
unclear what “context” is. Th e dangers attendant upon this lack of clarity are 
exemplifi ed by the judgment of Justice Rouleau in Mills v Ontario (Workplace 
Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal):205
200. Dunsmuir, supra note 21 at para 45.
201. Ibid at para 47.
202. Ibid at para 135. See also Fraternité des policiers, supra note 100 at paras 13-14; Globalive, 
supra note 58 at para 32. 
203. Supra note 156.
204. Ibid at para 59.
205. 2008 ONCA 436, 168 ACWS (3d) 679.
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Applying the reasonableness standard will now require a contextual approach to 
deference where factors such as the decision-making process, the type and expertise 
of the decision-maker, as well as the nature and complexity of the decision will be 
taken into account. Where, for example, the decision-maker is a minister of the 
Crown and the decision is one of public policy, the range of decisions that will fall 
within the ambit of reasonableness is very broad. In contrast, where there is no real 
dispute on the facts and the tribunal need only determine whether an individual 
breached a provision of its constituent statute, the range of reasonable outcomes is, 
perforce, much narrower.206
At no point does Justice Rouleau explain from whence springs his reliance on 
the status of the decision maker, whether the decision is a “public policy” decision 
or whether there is “no real dispute” on the facts. Th ere may be something to 
be said for a departure from the four factors relied on in the standard of review 
analysis, but it ought to be stated explicitly. For now, the risk created by an open-
ended defi nition of reasonableness that “takes its colour from the context”207 is 
that a potentially unlimited number of factors might be taken into account by 
reviewing courts in their determination of context.
It seems to me that there are really only two possible means of preventing 
the judicial determination of context from sliding into a morass of multiple 
considerations, the signifi cance of which changes from one case to the next.208 One 
possibility is that the severity of the error complained of defi nes the context. Th e 
more serious the error or errors made by the decision maker, the more work the 
decision maker will have to do to convince the reviewing court that the decision 
was, nonetheless, reasonable. To put it another way, the more severe the error, 
the greater the burden on the decision maker to demonstrate that the decision 
was within the range of reasonable outcomes and to show the justifi cation, 
transparency, and intelligibility of the process by which it was taken. Yet this 
approach was ruled out by the Court in Dunsmuir when it jettisoned the patent 
unreasonableness standard. In the end, a focus on severity will inevitably prove 
unavailing. To say that a decision is “clearly irrational” rather than “irrational” is 
“surely a tautology,”209 and a statement that an error is ‘very severe’ rather than 
206. Ibid at para 22.
207. Khosa, supra note 156 at para 59.
208. For an extreme example, see Pharmascience Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FCA 258 at 
para 4, 68 CPR (4th) 459. See also Catalyst, supra note 58 at paras 17, 21, 24. In Catalyst, the 
Court apparently announced a reasonableness standard that is unique to review of municipal 
by-laws, a stance it was seemingly pushed into adopting by a variety of contextual factors.
209. David J Mullan, “Recent Developments in Standard of Review” in Taking the Tribunal 
to Court: A Practical Guide for Administrative Law Practitioners (Ontario: Canadian Bar 
Association, 2000) at 25.
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‘severe simpliciter’ has the same tautological quality. As Justice LeBel argued in an 
infl uential set of concurring reasons: 
Th ere seems to me to be no qualitative basis on which to diff erentiate eff ectively 
between these various characterizations of a rationality analysis; how, for instance, 
would a decision that is not “tenably supported” (and is thus “merely” unreasonable) 
diff er from a decision that is not “rationally supported” (and is thus patently 
unreasonable)?210 
Justice Bastarache subsequently made the same point extra-judicially: “Much 
like being somewhat pregnant, one cannot be somewhat unreasonable.”211 If the 
context for the purposes of a reasonableness analysis is composed, to any degree, 
of the severity of the error complained of, it runs into the diffi  culties identifi ed 
by Justices Bastarache and LeBel in Dunsmuir.212
Th e second possibility is that context is determined by the factors in the 
standard of review analysis.213 For example, according to David Mullan’s 
interpretation of Justice Binnie, “[U]nder the umbrella of unreasonableness review, 
questions of fact should be approached with particular care and deference.”214 
Th e British Columbia Court of Appeal has suggested that the range of acceptable 
outcomes will be “dictated by the nature of the question.”215 Expertise, statutory 
purpose, and the presence or absence of privative or appeal clauses could also 
contribute to the relevant context, making it more or less deferential. Th e irony 
of shooing the standard of review analysis out the front door while allowing it to 
skulk in through the back door is striking. But this approach suggests that the 
Court’s attempts to marginalize the standard of review analysis are doomed to 
failure. Something must determine the context for the application of the unifi ed 
reasonableness standard, and the standard of review analysis (or some variant 
thereon) seems the most plausible candidate. In the wake of Dunsmuir, the old 
standard of review factors seem to be capable of exercising an infl uence—from 
the intensive care unit, if not from beyond the grave. But if that is the case, the 
210. Toronto (City) v Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE), Local 79, 2003 SCC 63 at para 
107, 3 SCR 77.
211. Bastarache, supra note 132 at 235.
212. Dunsmuir, supra note 21 at paras 40-42.
213. Gerald P Heckman, “Substantive Review in Appellate Courts since Dunsmuir” (2009) 47:4 
Osgoode Hall LJ 751 at 778-79. 
214. David Mullan, “Proportionality – a Proportionate Response to an Emerging Crisis in 
Canadian Judicial Review Law?” (2010) NZL Rev 233 at 248. Binnie J was explicit about 
this in his concurring reasons in Alberta Teachers’ Association, supra note 56 at paras 85-89.
215. Teamsters Local Union No 31 v Shadow Lines Transportation Group, 2009 BCCA 130 at para 
94, 308 DLR (4th) 90, Ryan JA.
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utility of the categorical approach is further reduced, quite apart from its own 
inherent fl aws and internal contradictions.
VIII. CONCLUSION: FORM OR SUBSTANCE?
I have demonstrated numerous shortcomings of the categorical approach 
advocated by the Court. Th e development of these particular categories is 
misguided, relying on dubious abstract concepts and fl awed, hidden assumptions. 
Th e categories are unclear. Th ey are both over- and under-inclusive. Th ey confl ict 
with one another. Th ey may not even help the Court to achieve its purported aim 
of marginalizing the standard of review analysis. 
More generally, the categorical approach represents the unfortunate triumph 
of form over substance. By form, I mean the development of conceptual categories 
into which decisions must be placed without regard to whether the achievement 
of the substantive ends intended by the development of the categories are actually 
furthered by placing a particular decision in a category. By substance, I mean 
paying attention to the eccentricities of the individual decision and the statutory 
provisions pursuant to which it was made.216 For present purposes, I treat the 
standard of review analysis as an example of a substantive approach. I do not 
endorse the standard of review analysis—far from it. I examine the fl aws in the 
standard of review analysis elsewhere, in the course of developing an alternative 
approach.217 But compared to the categorical approach, the standard of review 
analysis is a superior metric in its substantive and deferential orientation. Only 
against the frailties of the formalistic, categorical approach championed by the 
Court can the strengths of a more substantive approach be properly appreciated. 
My discussion of the approach recently pursued by the Court prompts four 
general observations. Th e fi rst three relate to the triumph of form over substance; 
the last relates to the possible shift from the Court’s previously deferential posture.
216. See PS Atiyah & Robert S Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1987) at 2-5. Th e authors suggest the distinction between form and 
substance. A substantive reason “may be defi ned as a moral, economic, political, institutional, 
or other social consideration” whereas a formal reason “is a legally authoritative reason on 
which judges and others are empowered or required to base a decision or action, and such a 
reason usually excludes from consideration, overrides, or at least reduces the weight of, any 
countervailing substantive reasoning arising at the point of decision or action.”
217. Daly, A Th eory of Deference, supra note 4. I do not argue explicitly for a substantive as 
opposed to formal approach. Indeed, I suggest therein that my own approach is neither 
fi sh nor fowl, at least in terms of the traditional distinction between form and substance in 
administrative law. 
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First, the standard of review analysis largely respects the traditional view of 
courts as agents of the legislature, with a duty to give eff ect to legislative intent 
(while at the same time ensuring that the legislature had remained within its 
constitutional boundaries). Th is is not legislative intent in any literal or formalistic 
sense, but in the sense once described by Lord Reid: Courts should seek “the 
meaning of the words which Parliament used.”218 To prefer a categorical approach 
is to subjugate legislative intent to autonomous judicial development of categories 
of review. Th ere is precedent for this approach since it is how judicial review has 
traditionally developed in the Commonwealth. But one of the great advances 
made by Canadian courts in developing the standard of review analysis was to 
take legislative enactments seriously. No longer was “legislative intent” treated as 
a purely formalistic incantation, an empty vessel into which courts could pour 
their desired judicial review doctrine. Rather, it was treated as providing guidance 
to courts as to how best to shape the law of judicial review. 
Second, the standard of review analysis is substantive and contextual in 
nature. Its application has forced reviewing courts to confront the nature of the 
statutory scheme, the nature of the relationship between the particular decision 
and the relative expertise of the decision maker, and the nature of the particular 
question presented for review. Perhaps it was too much to expect reviewing courts 
to abide by this framework. Too long a sacrifi ce may, after all, make a stone of the 
heart. From the perspective of an overworked judge struggling to clear a docket, 
the categorical approach has an appeal that the standard of review analysis 
cannot hope to match. But as I have demonstrated, that appeal is superfi cial. 
Th e categorical approach cannot hope to capture the nuances of the relationship 
between reviewing court, legislature, and decision maker. If reviewing courts 
want to be serious about giving eff ect to legislative intent, or, at the very least, 
according due weight to legislative enactments, there is no substitute for grappling 
with the relevant statutory provisions.
Th ird, the standard of review analysis had a justifi catory value. A reviewing 
court grappling with the standard of review had to explain its choice of standard. 
Perhaps it was too much to hope for a fully transparent explanation in all cases, but 
the standard of review analysis at least pushed reviewing courts in the direction 
of clear public pronouncements. By contrast, the categorical approach makes it 
too easy for reviewing courts simply to pick a category into which a decision falls 
with scant explanation as to why it does so. Viewed from the perspective of one 
who values transparency in judicial decision making, the (apparent) demise of 
the standard of review analysis is to be lamented. 
218. Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaff enburg AG, [1975] AC 591 at 
613, 2 WLR 513 (HL).
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Fourth, requiring reviewing courts to perform a standard of review analysis 
in all cases gave eff ect to a general policy of judicial deference. A reviewing 
court bent on applying a standard of review of correctness would have to jump 
through all the hoops of the standard of review analysis before doing so. Indeed, 
this exercise might have prompted many a reviewing court to reconsider its 
initial preference for a correctness standard. Now, however, the advent of the 
categorical approach makes it much easier for a reviewing court to avoid being 
deferential. As I have demonstrated, categorization will often be contestable, but 
the courts have identifi ed no criteria to guide the choice between the categories. 
A reviewing court minded to apply a correctness standard can simply choose one 
of the categories to which a standard of review of correctness applies. Th e barriers 
between a decision maker and a non-deferential court erected by the standard of 
review analysis have been torn down by Dunsmuir and the Court’s subsequent 
decisions.
Nonetheless, there are encouraging signs. Th e Court has recently leaned 
towards review on a standard of reasonableness on the contentious questions that 
have come before it.219 Moreover, in Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v 
Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board),220 the Court made clear that concern 
about the erosion of deference motivated it to treat the adequacy of reasons as going 
to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a decision, rather than to procedural 
fairness. Alleged shortcomings in the adequacy of reasons are not to be reviewed 
on a standard of correctness.221 In light of this decision, and that of the majority of 
the Court in Alberta Teachers’ Association, one lower court judge has suggested that, 
in eff ect, “the Supreme Court has told reviewing Courts to ‘back off ’, at least in 
reviewing an administrative body’s interpretation of its home statute, closely related 
statutes, and frequently encountered common law principle.”222 Moving back in 
the direction of a substantive approach to judicial review would cohere with these 
apparent tendencies towards deference. Th e Court ought to do so.
219. See text accompanying supra notes 177-193.
220. 2011 SCC 62, 3 SCR 708.
221. Ibid at para 21.
222. Procrane Inc (Sterling Crane) v Alberta (Appeals Commission for Alberta Workers’ Compensation), 
2012 ABQB 37 at para 22, AJ No 55 (QL), Clackson J.
